Name: Ras0x (individual)

Wallet Address or ENS: ras0x.eth

Tally Profile URL: Tally | ras0x.eth

Who am I ?

Crypto enthusiast since 2017. I started as a Public Delegate in EulerDAO and then was promoted to the Active Delegate in the DAO. I helped, among other things, to fine tune the governance processes, including Governance optimisation, anti-gaming voting mechanisms, Recognised Delegates programme etc.

My values:

1. Adherence to the founding principles of a project: in this case enshrined in the Article 5 of the Arbitrum Constitution.
2. Impartiality: Before making the final decisionI I take into account all opinions of the DAO members.
3. Transparency: My rationale behind any decision is public.
4. Scrutiny: Any proposal should be properly discussed and examined.
5. Security: Security of the ecosystem and DAO shall prevail over momentary market opportunities.

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

First and foremost the DAO needs to fine-tune its governance process, that includes but not limited to:

• Sustainable participation of representatives of various groups of the community, i.e. developers, the team, investors and foremost ordinary users. Incentivized programmes and delegate hierarchy are strongly recommended.
• Decisions should be taken by the community as a whole and not just big token holders, primarily investors or the team.
• Transparent and systematized governance process, including timing, proposal templates, step-by-step proposal life cycle. Anti-gaming and bots-preventing mechanisms should be developed.
• A comprehensive and efficient grant management.
• Due diversification of the treasury should be envisaged.

As for the question how aggressive we should be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO? I would prefer steady growth vs aggressive marketing through liquidity mining to raise TVL. My experience shows that it is wise to keep incentive tools for the future promotion of new products. I would suggest at least 5+ years liquidity mining with steady increases over time till the middle and gradual decrease after.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1. Uniswap x Flipside:

1. How would you vote?

Against, unless amendments described below are made.

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

I would suggest the following amendments:

• Set a trial period of 6 months with reduced budget to at least $ 3 mil. (Despite Flipside previously implemented a pilot, the budget was only $ 25 k that cannot provide the DAO with reliable proves that Flipside will be able to manage bigger amounts of money)
• Decrease the number of seats to be occupied by the Flipside team in the Allocation Committee to 1.
• Increase the overall number of seats in the Oversight committee to 4, so that the Flipside member does not have the final say.
• Guarantee that Uniswap labs team has one seat in each Committee.
• The rest of the seats shall be democratically elected by the DAO and not be nominated upfront without elections.
• The economy of the programme is largely based on projected yield earned. However, with the extreme turbulence on crypto markets the DAO cannot rely exclusively on yield projections. In this regard, there economy should be split into two scenarios: 1) basic/neutral, that will guarantee implementation of the programme disrespectful to the yield earned or not earned and 2) bonus, that will include projected yields

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

That is the major dilemma of any DAO. First we need to split this into ordinary and emergency issues. The First should rely on decentralized decision making, while the second requires immediate actions for the benefit of the DAO, consequently centralisation of authority is justified in this case. This dilemma is well addressed in the Arbitrum Constitution.

Another aspect is participation. With time the passion of the majority of the DAO will inevitably reduce. Thus, I believe that long-standing members of the DAO that show sustainable participation of the DAO shall have more powers within the DAO. All in all, a natural selection of active and useful members will occur.

As for the voting itself, we need to avoid situations when big token holders, primarily investors, control the decision-making process. Instead, I would suggest that the DAO obliged them to distribute a part of their voting power to the recognised community members described in the previous paragraph.

Sample Voting Issue 2. FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement:

1. Split Reimbursement. The Defi protocols are designed to have reserves coming from transaction fees. These reserves should be used to cover possible hacks. If reserves could cover all losses then full reimbursement should take place. The general idea is that the amount to be covered should be equal to reserves.

Another aspect is the amount of funds in the Treasury. If the amount hack is not significant, the DAO may decide to use part of the treasury to cover losses in order to avoid reputation risks. On the other hand, if losses greatly exceed the Treasury, than using it to cover losses will just lead to skyrocketing dump of a governance token and closure of the project without any prospects, like it happened with FEI.

Languages I speak and write: English, Spanish.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I testify that I will operate with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind. With this being said, I testify that I have no conflicts of interest that would prevent me from using my best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem. If any occurs in the future, I will immediately notify the DAO.